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Abstract
We investigate the effects of a statewide program designed to increase the supply of teachers in
designated “hard-to-staff” areas, such as special education, math, and science. Employing a
difference-in-difference estimator we find that the loan forgiveness component of the program was
effective, reducing mean attrition rates for middle and high school math and science teachers by
10.4 percent and 8.9, respectively. We also find that the impact of loan forgiveness varied with
the generosity of payments; when fully funded the program reduced attrition of special education
teachers by 12.3 percent, but did not have a statistically significant impact when funding was
substantially reduced. A triple-difference estimate indicates that a one-time bonus program also
had large effects, reducing the likelihood of teachers’ exit by as much as 32 percent in the short
run. A back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis suggests that both the loan forgiveness and the
bonus program were cost effective.
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I. Introduction
Many school districts in the United States experience chronic shortages of teachers in highneed areas such as special education, math, and science. While there have been limited attempts
to offer salary premiums to teachers in hard-to-staff subject areas, differential pay by subject area
is controversial, and the more common policy response has been to offer indirect compensation in
the form of either ex-ante or ex-post educational subsidies. Despite their widespread use, little is
known about the efficacy of programs that link scholarships or student loan repayment to the labor
supply of teachers. In this paper, we analyze one of the longest running such programs, Florida’s
Critical Teacher Shortage Program (FCTSP), in order to gauge the efficacy of non-wage
compensation schemes on teacher retention.

We focus on the program’s loan forgiveness

component, which targeted early career teachers who were certified and taught in a set of
designated shortage areas. Eligible teachers could have up to $10,000 in student loan debt repaid
if they continued to teach in high-need subjects. In addition, we investigate the impact one-time
retention bonuses of up to $1,200 that were offered to Florida teachers in specific subjects and
grade levels. By comparing the impacts of the two policies on teacher attrition, we are able to
gauge the efficacy of loan forgiveness relative to more direct monetary compensation.
As described in more detail below, the FCTSP began in the mid-1980s and continued for
over 20 years, finally being terminated by the Florida legislature in 2011. Over that span, there
were numerous changes in the particular subject areas covered and substantial variation in funding
for the program. The discrete changes in subject area coverage from one year to the next, large
and abrupt changes in funding, as well as the sudden termination of the loan forgiveness program
can be viewed as plausibly exogenous events that can be used to identify the effects of varying
compensation on retention of teachers in high-need areas. We utilize a difference-in-differences
framework that exploits these inter-temporal changes to produce causal estimates of the impact of
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both the loan forgiveness and bonus programs on retention of teachers in Florida public schools.
We find that loan forgiveness and targeted bonuses can both substantially reduce teacher attrition
in high-need areas, although bonuses appear to have a larger impact in the short-run. We then
translate these retention effects into estimated impacts on the steady state distribution of teacher
experience and conduct a rough cost-benefit calculation; both loan forgiveness and bonuses appear
to be cost effective policies.
Before delving into the analysis, we begin with a general discussion of the teacher shortage
problem, its root causes, and the menu of options available to policy makers. This is followed by
a detailed description of the FCTSP and associated teacher retention bonuses in Florida. We then
provide a summary of the existing evidence on loan forgiveness, differential pay, and bonus
programs for teachers.

We subsequently describe our data and empirical methods before

presenting our findings and discussing their implications.
II. The Teacher Shortage Problem and Potential Solutions
While concern is frequently expressed about shortages of teachers in general, school
staffing problems are typically concentrated in certain subject areas, such as secondary math and
science, special education, and foreign languages. Teachers with transferable skills that are valued
in other occupations, such as math and science teachers with technical skills, or teachers with
knowledge of foreign languages, have relatively high opportunity costs and thus would be
expected to garner a wage premium in an unfettered market. Likewise, teachers working in
challenging or stressful situations, such as special education teachers, would normally command
a compensating wage differential. However, the wages of public school teachers are typically
determined by fixed salary schedules that vary only by years of experience and educational
attainment. As a result, schools find it difficult to attract and retain high-quality teachers in these
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areas. Ingersoll and Perda (2009) find that roughly three to four times as many secondary schools
report significant difficulty in filling positions in mathematics, special education, and science
relative to English or social studies. Similarly, Billingsley, Fall, and Williams (2006) report that
high percentages of uncertified new special educators enter teaching each year. In Florida, the
percentage of new hires in special education, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL),
and math and science who are not certified in their subject typically far exceeds that of elementary
education teachers (Florida Department of Education, 2008).
The problems with staffing such “high-need” areas are exacerbated in urban schools and
schools serving high proportions of low-income students since (given fixed salary schedules)
teachers tend to migrate toward schools with high achieving students from affluent backgrounds
and avoid schools serving primarily minority students, low-achieving students, and students with
disciplinary problems (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004;
Boyd, et al., 2005; Imazeki, 2005; Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007; Feng, 2009). Further,
filling positions in high-need areas with unqualified personnel may worsen supply problems in the
long run. Miller, Brownell, and Smith (1999) find uncertified special education teachers are less
likely to stay in their positions and attrition rates among beginning teachers with minimal
preparation is twice as high compared to those with more extensive preparation (Boe, Cook, &
Sunderland, 2006).
Given the supply curve for teachers is upward sloping (Falch, 2010, Wolter, & Denzler,
2003) and wage increases have been shown to boost teacher retention (Hendricks, 2014), the most
obvious solution to staffing problems in “high-need” areas would be to offer higher wages. The
market-clearing wage will depend on subject-area training requirements, alternative wages outside
of teaching, and working conditions within classrooms and schools. Consequently, the requisite
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wage premium to avoid shortages will likely vary by field. Both teacher labor unions and
individual teachers have tended to resist differential pay systems, however. As a result, instances
where teacher salaries vary consistently by subject area are relatively rare. Only a small number
of school districts offer permanent salary differentials for teachers in high need-need subjects
(Martin, 2007). The State of Georgia allows new math and science teachers to start at a pay rate
equivalent to teachers with five years of experience, but the differential declines over time and is
eliminated at the end of five years (Griffin & McGuire, 2015).
As an alternative to explicit permanent salary differentials, a variety of differentialcompensation schemes designed to attract and retain teachers in hard-to-staff subjects have been
employed. Loan forgiveness, whereby some or all of a teacher’s student loan debt is paid off if
they continue to teach in a particular subject area or type of school, is probably the most common
strategy. At least 40 states offer some kind of loan forgiveness or ex-ante scholarship program for
teachers, although the specifics of the programs vary considerably (American Federation of
Teachers, 2009). In addition, the U.S. Department of Education will forgive up to $17,500 of debt
for highly qualified math, science, or special education teachers who have taught continuously for
five years in a school serving primarily low-income students (Martin, 2007). One-time “signing
bonuses” or moving expense reimbursements for new recruits, although less common, have been
used in a number of states such as California, Mississippi, and Virginia (Martin, 2007). Finally,
some school districts have offered retention bonuses for short periods of time, and North Carolina
offered bonuses to math, science, or special education teachers in schools serving primarily lowincome students for three years (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008).
While more palatable politically, the temporary nature of alternative incentive schemes
may limit their efficacy in combating teacher shortages. Signing bonuses or reimbursements for
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moving expenses would only affect initial employment decisions of prospective teachers, but
would not impact the relative costs and benefits of remaining a teacher. Likewise, loan forgiveness
programs would only alter the labor market decisions of teachers who have outstanding student
loan debt and have not yet received the maximum allowed amount of loan forgiveness. Although
retention bonuses should affect short-term employment choices of teachers, to the extent the
retention bonuses are viewed as temporary, they will have limited impacts on the long-run supply
of teachers since they will have only modest effects on the present value of life-time earnings.
III. Program Details
The Florida Critical Teacher Shortage Program (FCTSP) was established in 1984 by the
Florida Legislature to increase the supply of teachers in particular certification areas. Awards were
made to qualifying teachers beginning in 1986/1987 and continued through 2009/2010, after which
the Florida Legislature discontinued funding for the FCTSP.1 The FCTSP had two primary
components: a tuition reimbursement program and a loan forgiveness program. Annual spending
on the program averaged over three million dollars per year, with more than 90 percent of funds
allocated to the loan forgiveness component.
The tuition reimbursement program was designed primarily to encourage existing teachers
to become certified in a designated critical shortage subject area. To qualify, an individual had to
have been employed by a Florida public school during the academic year and taken courses leading
to certification or an advanced degree in a critical shortage area. To receive reimbursement for a
course, the teacher had to have passed the course with a minimum grade of 3.0 on a four-point
scale. In the tuition reimbursement program eligible teachers could receive payments of up to $78

1

Funding for both programs was eliminated by the 2011 Legislature, meaning the last cohort of teachers to receive
awards were those who applied in the 2009/10 school year. See Florida CS/HB 7087, 2011 Legislative Session for
more detail.
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per credit hour, for a maximum nine hours per award year or $702 per year. The maximum total
amount eligible applicants could receive was $2,808 for up to 36 credit hours. An initial analysis
showed that actual payouts were modest, averaging only $152 per recipient. Further, two years
prior to receiving tuition reimbursement, over two-thirds of eventual recipients were already
certified in a critical shortage area, suggesting the program was primarily subsidizing existing
teachers in critical shortage areas rather than inducing teachers to change subject areas. We
therefore focus the present analysis on the loan forgiveness component, which had substantially
higher monetary inducements for teachers.
The loan forgiveness program enhanced the compensation of eligible Florida teachers by
repaying student loans if they continued teaching in a designated critical shortage area. The
program targeted teachers who recently completed an undergraduate or graduate degree and were
in their first year of teaching in a critical shortage area in a public school. To be eligible, a teacher
had to have taught for at least 90 days in a critical shortage area and possess certification in that
area. Initial applications had to be made at the end of their first year teaching in the relevant
critical-shortage area.2 Shortage areas were typically announced well in advance (typically six to
eight months prior to the start of the academic year). Applications had to be submitted by early
July, based on applicants’ teaching and certification status in the just-completed school year.
Payments were typically made by the end of September.
Annual awards were prorated based on the number of eligible applicants and the total
appropriation provided by the Legislature. For undergraduate loans, the maximum allowable
award was $2,500 dollars per year; for graduate loans, the maximum was $5,000 per year. Awards
could be received for a maximum of four academic years or a total disbursement of $10,000,

2

See 2002 Florida Statutes 1009.58 (tuition reimbursement) and 1009.59 (loan forgiveness) and Florida
Administrative Code 6A-20.012 (tuition reimbursement) and 6A-20.013 (loan forgiveness).
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whichever came first.3 Actual compensation varied annually with the number of applicants and
the legislative appropriation. Funding for the programs was relatively stable until 2002, with loan
forgiveness payouts averaging $2,000 to 3,000 per teacher. The 2002 Legislature slashed funding
for the program, resulting in a nearly 48 percent reduction in funding and a drastic decrease in
payments per teacher. Annual numbers of participants and average payments for the loan
forgiveness program are provided in Figures 1 and 2. The drop in funding led to an increase in the
number of loan forgiveness recipients as payments were spread out over more years; the number
of initial recipients stayed relatively constant after the cut in funding.
The FCTSP legislation required the Florida State Board of Education to identify critical
teacher shortage areas each year. The Florida Commissioner of Education provided a list of
recommended areas to the board, based on: (i) current vacancies in the discipline, (ii) positions
filled by teachers lacking proper certification in the relevant field, (iii) the projected supply of
future graduates in the relevant area from state approved teacher preparation programs. Thus, the
designated shortage areas changed over time. For example, middle and secondary math was a
designated shortage area from 1984/1985 through 1992/1993; it was off the list of shortage areas
from 1993/19994 to 1999/2000, then was placed back on the list in 2000/2001. A matrix of
covered subjects by year is provided in Table 1.
In addition to the long-standing loan forgiveness and tuition reimbursement programs, the
2000 Florida Legislature appropriated $60 million for one-time recruitment and retention bonuses.
To receive a bonus, a teacher had to be a full-time middle or high school classroom teacher certified
and teaching foreign languages, science, math, or exceptional student education (special education

3

In the individual-level award data we observe approximately 20 percent of loan forgiveness recipients receiving
payments for five years or more. It is likely that most of these extended payment periods are due to teachers receiving
loan forgiveness for both an undergraduate degree and a graduate degree. In fact, nearly 15 percent of loan forgiveness
recipients received payments for both undergraduate and graduate loans.
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and gifted). Retention bonuses, which were capped at $1,200, were for teachers who had taught
in one of the designated subjects during the 1999/2000 school year, received a favorable
performance appraisal, and agreed to continue teaching in one of the designated areas during the
2000/2001 school year. Recruitment bonuses were for teachers who were employed by a district
for the first time in the 2000/2001 school year. Districts had discretion over the form of recruitment
bonuses. For example, they could be used to cover moving expenses or to purchase a laptop
computer. Like the retention bonuses, the payments were capped at $1,200 per teacher.4
The 2001 Florida Legislature also allocated $152 million for recruitment and retention
bonuses equal to $850 per teacher. Unlike the bonus program in 2000, the retention bonuses were
available to all teachers who had taught during the 2000/2001 school year, irrespective of grade
level or subject. Similarly, the signing bonuses were available to all new teachers.5
IV. Literature Review
Although loan forgiveness is among the most common teacher incentive schemes, there is
no prior research on the impact of loan forgiveness on either the supply of new teachers into
targeted fields or targeted schools or on the retention of existing teachers in these areas. There is
evidence that loan forgiveness programs in medicine have helped to retain physicians in rural and
medically underserved areas (Pathman et al., 2004). However, loan forgiveness programs were
shown to be less effective in attracting students into public interest law than tuition waivers of
equivalent value (Field, 2009).
The extant literature on pay differentials for teachers working in hard-to-staff subjects or
schools is similarly thin. Only one rigorous study of subject-area differential pay exists: an

4
5

See Florida Department of Education (2000).
Florida Department of Education (2001).
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analysis of an $1,800 per year retention bonus paid to existing North Carolina teachers (Clotfelter,
et al., 2008). The North Carolina program was a combination of subject-area and school-type
differential pay. To qualify, teachers had to be certified in math, science, or special education and
be working in middle and high schools that were serving primarily low-performing or low-income
students. The $1,800 bonus was equivalent to about four to five percent of the average pay of
teachers in North Carolina. Clotfelter, et al. (2008) adopt a difference-in-difference-in-difference
strategy to compare teachers before and after the implementation of the program, eligible teachers
with ineligible teachers, and teachers in eligible schools with those in ineligible schools. Despite
some problems in making teachers aware of the program, the targeted salary increases were
sufficient to reduce turnover rates by 17 percent.
There are also three rigorous studies of the effects of programs designed to increase the
supply of teachers in high-need schools. Steel, Murnane, and Willett (2009) study a California
program that offered a $20,000 bonus to a select group of new teachers that agreed to teach in
high-need schools. They find the program increased the likelihood that academically talented
teachers would begin teaching in low-performing schools, but the program had no effect on later
retention. Glazerman, et al. (2013) conduct an experimental analysis of the “Teacher Transfer
Initiative,” a federally funded initiative that offered $20,000 in incentives for high-quality teachers
to teach in low-achieving schools for two years. While teachers who transferred had a positive
impact on student test scores, only a small fraction of eligible teachers were induced to participate
in the program. Falch (2010, 2011) studies a decade-long bonus program for Norwegian teachers.
The program paid a wage premium of about 10 percent to teachers in schools with chronic staffing
shortages. The program was effective, reducing the likelihood of voluntary departures by about
six percentage points.
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V. Data
Data on individual-level payments to teachers were provided by the Florida Department of
Education’s Office of Student Financial Assistance (OSFA).

Although awards began in

1986/1987, we could only obtain individual-level data on loan forgiveness from 1996/1997
forward. Prior to 2002/2003, the loan forgiveness data did not distinguish between payments for
undergraduate and graduate loans, nor did they distinguish between initial awards and renewals.
Thus, for the first year of forgiveness data (1996/1997) we do not know whether payments made
in that year were for initial awards or renewals.
Data for the universe of Florida public school teachers from 1995/1996 through 2012/2013
was obtained from the Florida Department of Education’s Education Data Warehouse. These data
include demographic characteristics, educational attainment, experience, certifications held, and
classes taught for each individual teacher. Since the data are statewide, we can determine when a
teacher stops teaching in the Florida public schools.
Data for teachers are linked to the students they teach in each classroom, so we can
determine the characteristics of students a teacher instructs. The data also contain test scores for
individual students. The State of Florida administered the “Sunshine State Standards” Florida
Comprehensive Achievement Test (FCAT-SSS) for Math and Reading in each of three to ten
beginning in school-year 2000/2001 and ending in 2010/2011.6 We can therefore compute valueadded measures of the impact of individual teachers in these subjects for each of the academic
years 2001/2002 to 2010/2011.

6

Beginning in 2010/2011, the state adopted a new test, dubbed the FCAT 2.0. Scores for the first administration of
the FCAT 2.0 were retrofitted to be comparable to the original FCAT scores. The Florida Department of Education
does not deem the FCAT 2.0 scores from subsequent years to be comparable to those from the original FCAT,
however.
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VI. Methods
As described above, the loan forgiveness program primarily targeted early-career teachers
who were already teaching and certified in a designated subject area. While the loan forgiveness
program may have had some effect on the supply of new teachers in the long run, the most
immediate effect was on retention of existing teachers.7 We exploit the fact that teachers had to
be both eligible for the loan forgiveness program and the program had to be available in a given
year in order to receive payment and estimate a difference-in-difference model of the duration of
teaching in Florida public schools. To capture a teacher’s entire employment history, we limit the
analysis to teachers who are observed in their first year of teaching in Florida and had not taught
out-of-state for more than five years.
The difference-in-difference approach compares changes in teacher retention among
eligible teachers when a subject is placed on the critical shortage list with corresponding changes
in retention over time for ineligible teachers. The model includes both controls to account for
time-invariant differences in retention across subject areas and year indicators to control for
general trends in teacher labor markets conditions that may vary over time. However, the approach
could produce biased estimates of program effects if trends in the alternative wages of teachers
vary by subject area and those subject-specific labor market trends are correlated with the timing
of a subject being designated as a critical-need area. Given the variation in the timing of criticalneed areas across subjects and the abrupt and relatively permanent within subject changes in
designation (see Table 1), such a correlation seems unlikely, however. Further, as noted by

7

An analysis of long-run supply effects is difficult to conduct due to two data limitations. First, the Florida
Education Data Warehouse only includes information on post-secondary students who attend public colleges and
universities in Florida; therefore, we cannot track the number of students who obtain education degrees in private
post-secondary institutions. Second, for students in public colleges and universities, we only have course taking and
major information for the period 2000/2001 through 2011/2012. The readily identifiable critical-need subject areas
(math, science, special education, and ESOL) were each designated shortage areas throughout this time period,
thereby eliminating the possibility of a difference-in-differences analysis.
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Chingos and West (2012), relatively few teachers who exit public school teaching move to jobs
outside of the educational sector, reducing the likelihood of bias coming from inter-temporal
fluctuations in labor supply and demand conditions in other industries.
Formally, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model can be represented as:
𝐿𝐹
𝐿𝐹
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0 (𝑡)exp(𝛽1𝑗 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑗 𝑍𝑡𝑗
+ 𝛽3𝑗 (𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗
) + 𝛾(𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜋(𝐷𝑘 ))

(1)

where (ti) is the probability that a teaching spell ends at the close of period t for teacher i,
conditional on that spell lasting through period t.8 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 is a set of indicators for teachers who ever
meet the loan forgiveness criteria of being certified and teaching in subject j, where j=1 to N, and
𝐿𝐹
N is the number of ever-covered subjects.9 𝑍𝑡𝑗
is a set of indicators that signify the loan

forgiveness program was in place in year t for subject j. Xit is a vector of teacher and school
characteristics that typically impact teacher attrition decisions (e.g. demographic characteristics of
students taught, class size, students’ prior behavior, students’ prior achievement levels, teacher
gender, teacher race/ethnicity, teacher experience, and base salary). Also included in X are a set
of year indicators to capture any unobserved time-varying factors affecting teacher labor market
decisions. Dk is a vector of indicators for teachers teaching in a given district k. They account for
any district-level factors that might be correlated with the likelihood that a teacher receives loan
forgiveness and the probability of exit. The set of coefficients 1j represent the difference in the
hazard rates between ever-eligible teachers (those certified and teaching in each subject j) and
never-eligible teachers.10 2j represents the impact of being in a year in which a subject is covered

8

We determine the end of a spell based on whether a teacher is teaching in a Florida public school in period t+1. Only
a teacher’s first teaching spell is considered; all exits are treated as permanent.
9
By comparing ever-eligible teachers to never-eligible teachers the categorization of teachers does not change over
time. However, treatment depends on both being an “ever-eligible” teacher and being in a year in which the
𝐿𝐹
teacher’s subject area is a designated critical shortage area, i.e. (𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗
). Thus, treatment is time dependent.
10
When estimating the model for each subject, we exclude teachers who are ever eligible in another covered subject.
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by the loan forgiveness program (both designated a critical-need area and the loan forgiveness
program is in existence for that subject). The coefficients of interest are 3j (j=1, N). These
coefficients represent the effect of being eligible for the loan forgiveness program in subject j and
being in a year in which the program was in effect for the given subject. 3j therefore represents
the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the loan forgiveness program on the exit
hazard in subject j. While we observe both teaching assignments and certification status of
teachers in each year, we do not know whether they possessed any student loan debt to be forgiven.
The estimated impact, 3, therefore should be interpreted as the impact of the “intent to treat.”
The effects of the one-time retention bonuses can similarly be analyzed in the context of
the Cox proportional hazard model. Recall that the 2000 retention bonus was limited to teachers
who taught in a designated set of critical-need subjects at the middle and high school level in the
1999/2000 school year. Let 𝑆𝑖𝐵 be an indicator for teachers who ever met the retention bonus
criteria of being certified and teaching in the set of designated subject areas. The variable 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵
indicates teachers teaching middle and high school classes, and 𝑍𝑡𝐵 is an indicator for the single
year the program was in effect. Combining these variables with the loan forgiveness program
factors into a single hazard model yields:11
𝐿𝐹
𝐿𝐹
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0 (𝑡)exp(𝛽1𝑗 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑗 𝑍𝑡𝑗
+ 𝛽3𝑗 (𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗
) + 𝛾(𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛿(𝐷𝑘 ) +

𝛿1𝑗 𝑆𝑖𝐵 + 𝛿2 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵 + 𝛿3 𝑍𝑡𝐵 + 𝛿4 (𝑆𝑖𝐵 × 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵 ) + 𝛿5 (𝑆𝑖𝐵 × 𝑍𝑡𝐵 ) + 𝛿6 (𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵 × 𝑍𝑡𝐵 ) +
𝛿7 (𝑆𝑖𝐵 × 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵 × 𝑍𝑡𝐵 ))

(2)

11

In the estimation of equation (2) some terms are redundant and thus drop out of the equation. Since the bonus
subjects are all also loan-forgiveness subjects at one time, the term 𝛿1𝑗 𝑆𝑖𝐵 is omitted from the estimated equation.
Likewise, the term 𝛿3 𝑍𝑡𝐵 is omitted because it is coincident with the year 1999 indicator that is included in the X
vector.

13

The coefficient of interest for the year 2000 retention bonus program is 7, the coefficient on the
triple-interaction term. It represents the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate of the
impact of the retention bonus program on the exit hazard. We also estimate a variant of equation
(2) that accounts for the drop in funding for the loan forgiveness program, beginning in 2001/2002.
𝐿𝐹
In this alternative specification, we divide the interaction term, (𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗
), into two components,
𝐿𝐹−ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ

𝐿𝐹−𝑙𝑜𝑤
(𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗
) and (𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐿𝐹 × 𝑍𝑡𝑗

), where high represents the pre-2001/2002 period and low

is the period 2001/2002 and later.
Unlike the year 2000 program, the retention bonus program in 2001 covered all teachers,
regardless of their subject area or grade level. Therefore the terms 𝑆𝑖𝐵 and 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐵 would each equal
one for all teachers, and all of the bonus-related terms in equation (2) would collapse to a single
indicator for the 2000/2001 school year. Consequently, it is not possible to isolate the impact of
the across-the-board retention bonus program offered in 2000; any effect of the year 2000 retention
bonus program is subsumed in the year 2000 indicator contained in the X vector.
Besides the effects on aggregate supply of teachers to designated subject areas, the efficacy
of the loan forgiveness programs also depends on how it affects the quality of teachers in criticalshortage-area subjects. If effective, the loan forgiveness program increases retention of teachers
who meet the eligibility criteria, i.e. they are certified and teaching in a designated critical-need
subject area. If such teachers had exited, a substantial portion would likely have been replaced
with uncertified teachers since finding fully certified teachers in the designated subjects by
definition is difficult. Thus, we compare the quality distribution of loan forgiveness recipients
with teachers who did not receive loan forgiveness, but were ever certified and teaching in the
same subject and with non-recipients teaching in the same subject who were never certified. Since
achievement tests are administered in consecutive grades for only two subjects, math and reading,
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we can only compute value-added measures for teachers who are responsible for math or reading
instruction. The critical-need subject with the most direct link to state assessments is middle and
high school math. In addition, due to their large number, we also compare value added in math
and in reading for special education teachers.

VII. Empirical Results
A. Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics for Florida K-12 teachers and their students. The data
are broken down into four categories: (i) teachers who did not participate in either the loan
forgiveness, tuition reimbursement, or bonus programs;(ii) teachers eligible for loan forgiveness
(i.e. those who were certified and taught in a critical need area in the same year); (iii) loan
forgiveness recipients; and (iv) recruitment-and-retention bonus recipients. Due to the nature of
the loan forgiveness program, the recipients tend to be much younger and have less experience
than non-recipients. Loan forgiveness recipients appear similar to loan forgiveness-eligible
teachers, suggesting that self-selection of participants may be minimal. The makeup of classrooms
appears to be similar across loan forgiveness recipients and non-recipients. The one exception is
a higher number of disciplinary incidents per student. However, that is likely due to the fact that
designated shortage areas are mainly in middle and high school subjects and special education,
areas that tend to have a greater incidence of disciplinary problems than elementary school regular
education classes. Over half of loan forgiveness recipients are special education teachers. The
next most common areas are middle/high school math and science teachers, each making up about
one-fifth of recipients (with some overlap).
Table 3 provides a tabulation of experience for first-time recipients of loan forgiveness.
As expected, loan forgiveness primarily affects early-career teachers. Nearly three-fourths of first
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time loan forgiveness recipients are in their first two years of teaching, and nearly 90 percent are
in their first four years of teaching when they receive their initial award.
B. Patterns of Loan Forgiveness and Teacher Retention
Descriptive evidence on the efficacy of the loan forgiveness program is provided in Figure
3, which plots Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of teaching in Florida public schools, broken down
by whether or not a teacher ever received a loan forgiveness payment. In order to account for
differences in attrition across subject areas, the sample is limited to teachers who were ever
simultaneously certified and taught in a critical shortage area. For the first six years of teaching,
loan forgiveness recipients are more likely to remain a public school teacher in Florida than nonrecipients. The survival rates are essentially equal in years seven and eight, and then the survival
rate of non-recipients exceeds that of recipients in subsequent years. Recall that recipients can
receive loan forgiveness for an undergraduate loan for up to four years, and the modal experience
level of initial recipients is one year (i.e. teachers in their second year of teaching). The higher
survival rates observed over the first six years of teaching are consistent with the loan forgiveness
program reducing teacher attrition as long as recipients are receiving payments.
C. Causal Evidence of Loan Forgiveness and Bonuses on Teacher Retention
In Table 4 we present Cox Proportional Hazard model estimates of the determinants of exit
from Florida public schools (equation 2). Estimates from four models are presented, each with
varying numbers of controls in the X vector.12 In Model 1, which excludes any controls for the
characteristics of teachers or the students they teach, we find that loan forgiveness significantly
reduces the probability of exit for middle/high school science teachers (8.9 percent), middle/high
school math teachers (10.4 percent), foreign language teachers (12.2 percent), and ESOL teachers

12

For space considerations, we only present the estimates of the key interaction terms. Estimates of the full set of
model coefficients are available upon request.
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(27.4 percent). The larger point estimates for foreign language teachers and ESOL teachers should
be viewed with some caution, however, since these teachers each constitute a small share of loan
forgiveness recipients (see Table 2). The estimates remain relatively constant as additional
controls for teacher, and student characteristics are added to the model. Although the estimated
hazard for the largest group of loan recipients, special education/gifted teachers, is less than one,
it is statistically insignificant.13
The average base salary for teachers during the time period of analysis is approximately
$35,000, and the annual loan forgiveness payments to lenders averaged around $1,200. Thus, the
average loan forgiveness recipient experienced a roughly 3.4% increase in net pay. Given the
estimated reductions in exit probabilities of 10.4 percent for middle and high school math teachers
and 8.9 percent for middle and high school science teachers, this implies exit elasticities for middle
and high school math and science teachers of -3.1 and -2.6, respectively. These estimates are
comparable to the estimated elasticity of turnover of -3 from an $1,800 bonus payment in North
Carolina (Clotfelter et al., 2008). They are also similar to the quit elasticity of -3.5 estimated from
a targeted school-wide bonus for certified teachers in Norway (Falch, 2010; Falch, 2011).
For the year 2000 bonus program we find a large and statistically significant effect on the
hazard ratio; the bonuses lead to a 32.2 percent reduction in the probability of exit. This finding
is robust across all three specifications. Given this was a one-time bonus, the large estimated
impact should be interpreted as a short-run effect and does not necessarily represent the impact on
retention of a permanent salary differential across subjects. Put differently, the bonus may have

13

We determine the subject area an individual is teaching in by the identity of the courses they teach. Special education
teachers (the majority of program participants) who are assigned solely to work with students with disabilities in
general education classes and do not teach any designated special education courses would not be classified as teaching
special education. Such situations are rare, however.
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induced teachers to stay in the public school system an additional year, but may not have
significantly affected long-run career plans.
We exploit the fact that the generosity of loan forgiveness abruptly dropped after
2000/2001 as an additional source of identifying variation by separating the interaction term in
equation (2) into two parts, one for the high-payout era prior to 2001/2002 and another for the lowpayout period after 2000/2001. This can only be done for the two subject areas that span the two
time periods, special education/gifted and ESOL.

Results from estimating this alternative

specification are given in Table 5.
The effect of the loan forgiveness program on the probability of exit for special
education/gifted teachers in the high-payout period is now estimated to be between -10.1 and -12.3
percent (depending on the number of controls) and is statistically significant at better than the one
percent level. During this high payout period, the average loan forgiveness amount is around
$2,000, which is equivalent to a 5.7 percent increase in net pay for the average teacher. The
attrition reduction of 10.9 percentage points (from the model with all controls included) therefore
translates into an exit elasticity of -1.9 for special education teachers. During the low payout
period, the average loan forgiveness payment was only about $750. This is equivalent to a two
percent increase in net pay for a teacher with the average salary. We estimate the effect of this
change in net salary on the exit probability of special education/gifted teachers to be small (-0.5
percent) and statistically insignificant.
For ESOL, the program effects are large and statistically significant in both the high and
low-payout periods, though smaller in the low payout period. In the model with all controls, the
estimated effect of loan forgiveness on the probability of exit for ESOL teachers is 42.1 percent in
the high payout period and 24.5 percent in the low payout period.
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We argue that the timing of declaring a subject to be an area of “critical shortage” is
uncertain and thus plausibly exogenous to teachers. However, once a subject area is placed in the
critical-shortage category, it has kept that designation throughout our sample period (see Table 1).
Thus, it is possible that once a subject is designated a critical shortage area, prospective teachers
who intend to stay in the public school system for several years, and would hence benefit the most
from loan forgiveness, could gravitate toward that subject. If this sort of selection into subject
areas occurs, it could upwardly bias our estimates of the impact of loan forgiveness on teacher
retention.
As a robustness check against this possible bias, we re-estimate the hazard model, limiting
the analysis sample to new-teacher cohorts for two years on either side of a change in subject-area
eligibility. Teachers entering just prior to a change in designation could not have anticipated the
change, and teachers entering just after the change in designation would likely have been too far
along in their college coursework to alter their major. Five subjects experienced a change in
critical teacher shortage status during our estimation period, middle/high science in 2000/2001,
middle/high math in 2000/2001, foreign languages in 2001/2002, middle/high English in
2008/2009, and reading in 2002/2003. Given the timing of eligibility changes, we re-estimated
the hazard model over four sets of new-teacher cohorts, 1998/1999 through 2001/02, 1999/2000
through 2002/2003, 2006/2007 through 2009/2010, and 2000/2001 through 2003/2004.
Results are presented in Table 6. Among the five subjects, the three in which loan
forgiveness had statistically significant effects on teacher attrition in the full-sample analysis,
science, math, and foreign languages, continue to be statistically significant in the restricted-cohort
analysis. The point estimates are similar as well, suggesting that strategic subject-area selection
by prospective teachers is not significantly biasing our results.
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D. Teacher Quality
Ultimately, the efficacy of loan forgiveness depends not only on the ability to attract and
retain teachers in high-need subjects, but also the quality of the teachers who are enticed to become
certified and teach (or induced not to leave). A causal analysis of the relationship between loan
forgiveness and teacher effectiveness is challenging, however. Value-added can only be computed
for 27 percent of teachers in our sample. Further, given that only math and reading exams were
administered in grades three through ten, several critical shortage areas have few teachers in tested
grades and subjects (e.g. foreign languages, middle/high school English, middle/high school
science).
Given the data limitations, we only present descriptive evidence for the two critical
shortage areas where value-added measures of teacher quality can be computed for a significant
number of teachers: middle/high school math and special education.14 In Figures 4A to 4C, we
present kernel density plots of teacher value-added in math for middle and high school math
teachers and value added in both math and reading for special education teachers. The valueadded estimates are the estimated teacher fixed effects in a model of student achievement that
includes the lagged test score, a vector of potentially time-varying student characteristics,
classroom peer characteristics, time invariant student characteristics, and a vector of potentially
time-varying school-level inputs.15 We compare recipients’ value-added distribution to that of
non-recipients teaching in the same subject to two comparison groups: non-recipients who were

14

We attempted to estimate the hazard model of teacher exit over three sub-samples of teachers, those in the bottom
quartile of the value-added distribution, those in the middle two quartiles and teachers in the top quartile. Given the
small samples, loan forgiveness was only found to have significant effects on the probability of exit for top and
bottom quartile special education teachers and top quartile ESOL teachers.
15
Details on the construction of the value-added measures are provided in Feng and Sass (2017).

20

ever simultaneously certified and taught in the same subject area and non-recipients who taught in
the same subject area, but who were never certified.
In Figure 4A, we see that loan forgiveness recipients are of essentially equal quality to nonrecipients who are teaching and certified in middle/high school math. In contrast, middle and high
school math teachers who are never certified are of much lower quality than loan forgiveness
recipients. Figures 4B and 4C provide similar comparisons for special education teachers in math
and in reading, respectively. The differences are not as stark as for middle and high school math
teachers. However, it is still the case that the value added for loan forgiveness recipients is
generally comparable to that of non-recipients who also are certified and teaching in special
education, whereas special education teachers who never become certified tend to have lower
value added scores.16
E. Student Achievement and Cost Effectiveness
Our findings indicate that both loan forgiveness and short-term bonuses can substantially
reduce teacher attrition in “difficult-to-staff” subjects like high school math and science and special
education. Further, the beneficiaries of these programs appear to be at least as productive as nonrecipients who are certified and teach in the same subject areas.
The direct benefits of the program to students depend on how the program affects the
equilibrium distribution of teachers. By reducing attrition, loan forgiveness, and retention,
bonuses will increase average teacher experience, which in turn increases the average contribution
of teachers to student achievement. In order to get rough estimates of the net benefit of loan

16

The positive relationship between subject-area certification and teacher value added may appear atypical at first
blush, given the general finding that teacher credentials are uncorrelated with teacher performance. However, much
of the value-added literature is based on regular education teachers in elementary and middle school. Clotfelter,
Ladd, and Vigdor (2010) find that in-subject certification is associated with higher student test scores in high school.
Similarly, Feng and Sass (2013) find that teachers of special education courses who are certified in special education
produce higher student test scores in both math and reading than do teachers who are not special-education certified.
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forgiveness and retention bonus strategies, we therefore first estimate the impacts or loan
forgiveness and bonuses on the distribution of teacher experience and then translate change in
teacher experience into expected impacts on student achievement. Finally, we translate student
achievement into monetary gains based on recent estimates of the relationship between teacher
quality and lifetime earnings.
To estimate the impact of the programs on the steady-state distribution of teacher
experience, we adopt the methodology of Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger (2008) and Hansen, Backes,
& Brady (2015). Using the results from Model 4 in Table 4 (and treating statistically insignificant
effects as equal to zero), the weighted average reduction in the attrition rate from loan forgiveness
is 6.3 percentage points. Applying this reduction in the attrition rate to the estimated attrition rates
for non-loan forgiveness recipients (Figure 3) yields annual retention probabilities for teachers
with and without the loan forgiveness program. From this, we can determine the steady state
distribution of teacher experience with and without loan forgiveness.
The ultimate impact on teacher effectiveness depends on the returns to teacher experience.
As noted in Table 2, the vast majority of loan forgiveness recipients taught special education,
middle/high school math, and middle/high school science. We are aware of only two studies in
the last decade that estimate within-teacher returns to experience for middle or high school math
(Ladd & Sorenson (2017) and Harris & Sass (2011)) and a single study that separately estimates
returns to experience for special education teachers at any grade level (Feng & Sass (2013)).17
Using the average of the estimates for middle school math teachers from Ladd and Sorenson (2017)
and from Harris and Sass (2011), which are quite similar, the increase in the steady-state value-

17

Some recent studies of middle school teachers do not include teacher fixed effects and therefore may conflate
returns to experience with differences in attrition across teachers of varying quality (e.g. Chingos and Peterson
(2011)), and others only estimate returns over broad bans of experience (e.g. Papay and Kraft (2015)).
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added of teachers is only 0.003 standard deviations. The lower return to experience for special
education teachers found in Feng and Sass (2013) suggests an increase in steady-state value-added
of only 0.001 standard deviations.18 If we instead employ the weighted average reduction in the
attrition rate of 13.7 percentage points from the era when the loan forgiveness program was fully
funded (Table 5), the steady-state increase in value-added rises to 0.007 standard deviations for
middle school math teachers and 0.002 for special education teachers. These estimates are in line
with the 0.005 standard deviation estimated impact of North Carolina’s bonus program reported
by Clotfelter, et al. (2008). The one-time bonus program in Florida was estimated to reduce the
attrition rate by 32.5 percentage points (Table 4), which translates to a 0.030 standard deviation
increase in steady-state value added for middle school math teachers and a 0.008 increase for
special education teachers.
Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) estimate the present value of the gain per student
from a one standard deviation increase in teacher value added to be $7,000. Applying this value
to our estimated changes in steady-state value added, the present value of the gain per student per
grade for regular education teachers would range from $21 to $49 for the loan forgiveness program
and $210 per student per grade for the bonus program. Following the Clotfelter, et al. assumption
of 100 students per teacher, the estimated single-year per-teacher benefit of the loan forgiveness
program for regular education teachers is $2,100 to $4,900, and the one-time per-teacher benefit
of the bonus program is $21,000.19 Given the per-teacher payouts for the loan forgiveness program
peaked at $3,000 in the fully funded era and dropped to a low of $550 when funding was cut, these

18

Feng and Sass (2013) do not include teacher fixed effects in their models, but do estimate returns to experience for
both regular education and special education teachers. We therefore take the relative return to special education
teachers from Feng and Sass (2013) and apply it to the within-teacher returns estimated in Harris and Sass (2011).
19
Due to large variation in special education class sizes and lack the lack of evidence on the long-run effects
increases in value-added for students with disabilities, we do not calculate per-teacher benefits separately for special
education teachers.
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rough calculations suggest that the benefits to students exceeded the costs. The bonus program
appears to have been even more cost-effective, generating benefits as high as $21,000 per teacher
from a maximum cost of $1,200 per teacher for the bonus program.
While the estimated direct benefits to students from reducing teacher attrition are
substantial, the total benefits may be even higher. By reducing the number of positions to be filled,
school districts avoid the costs associated with hiring new teachers. Barnes, Crowe, and Schaefer
(2007) estimate the costs of recruiting, hiring, and training a replacement teacher at $4,366 to
$17,872, depending on location. Other, more difficult to quantify, possible effects include greater
increases in teacher motivation/effort and investments in teaching-specific human capital.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
Fixed pay scales coupled with variation in the opportunity cost of teachers and working
conditions has led to chronic shortages of teachers in particular subject areas. Given opposition to
pay differentials from teachers, the most common policy response has been to provide non-salary
inducements for teachers to continue working in high-need areas. In this paper, we investigate the
efficacy of one such program, Florida’s Critical Teacher Shortage Program.
Exploiting variation in program coverage across time and across subjects, as well as
variation in the generosity of payments, we find that the loan forgiveness component of Florida’s
Critical Teacher Shortage Program did have substantial positive effects on the likelihood an
individual would remain in teaching. The impacts vary across subjects and depend in part on the
magnitude of payments. Positive effects were found for four of seven subject areas (science, math,
foreign languages, and ESOL). Positive effects were also found for the largest shortage-area
category, special education/gifted teachers, although only when payments were relatively large.
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We also find that the $1,200 one-time retention bonus offered to high school teachers in designated
subject areas decreased teacher attrition in the targeted areas by as much as 25 percent.
Our findings suggest that educational subsidies, particularly ex-post loan forgiveness for
early-career teachers, can be effective tools in promoting the retention of teachers in high-need
areas. We find that relatively modest payments of $500 to $1,000 per year can reduce attrition in
some high-need subjects, although in some subjects, such as special education, only payments on
the order of $2,500 per year appear effective. The efficacy of direct payments to teachers appears
to be more cost effective than loan subsidies. A one-time bonus of $1,200 reduced teacher attrition
more than loan repayments of comparable magnitude.
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Figure 1: Number of Teachers Receiving Loan Forgiveness Payments by Year, 1986/87-2009/10
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Source: Florida Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance, Annual Report to the Commissioner (various years) and authors’ calculations
from individual-level data.

Figure 2: Average Payment per Recipient in Loan Forgiveness Program by Year, 1986/87-2009/10
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Source: Florida Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance, Annual Report to the Commissioner (various years).
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Teaching in Florida Public Schools –
Teachers who Were Ever Certified and Taught in Any Critical Shortage Area
(Only Teachers Observed in Their First Year of Teaching)
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Figure 4A: Kernel Density Plot of Math Value-Added Distribution
by Loan Forgiveness Receipt – Middle and High School Math Teachers
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Figure 4B: Kernel Density Plot of Math Value-Added
Distribution by Loan Forgiveness Receipt – Special Education Teachers

Figure 4C: Kernel Density Plot of Reading Value-Added
Distribution by Loan Forgiveness Receipt – Special Education Teachers
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Table 1: Designated Critical Teacher Shortage Areas, 1984/1985 – 2009/2010

1984-1985
1985-1986
1986-1987
1987-1988
1988-1989
1989-1990
1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010

Math

Science

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

Middle
& High
Science

Middle
& High
Math

Speech
Therapy

x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Emotionally
Handicapped

ESE
("Handicapped")

ESE
(Special
Ed.)

x
x
x
x
x

Foreign
Languages

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

English

Middle
& High
English

Reading

ESOL

Tech.
Ed./
Ind.
Arts

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Source: Florida Department of Education, Critical Teacher Shortage Areas (various years). In School Year 1992-1993, Middle and High Level Science was specifically labeled Middle and
High Level Physical Sciences. In all years where Industrial Arts appears, except 1984-1985, it appears as Technology Education/Industrial Arts. Thus, they are listed as a combined area.
School psychologists were also designated as a shortage area from 2002/2003 through 2007/2008, but are omitted because they are not instructional personnel.
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Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Characteristics of Non-Recipients, Teachers
Eligible for Loan Forgiveness, Loan Forgiveness Recipients, and Bonus Recipients
NonRecipients

Female
Black
Hispanic
Other Non-White
Experience in Florida Public
Schools
Exited Florida Public Schools
Amount of Loan Forgiveness
Received ($)
Amount of Bonus Payment
Received ($)
Certified in Middle/HS Math
Certified in Middle/HS Science
Certified in Foreign Languages
Certified in Reading
Certified in Middle/HS English
Certified in Special Education
Certified in ESOL
Certified in Industrial Arts
Taught Middle/HS Math
Taught Middle/HS Science
Taught Foreign Languages
Taught Reading
Taught Middle/HS English
Taught Special Education
Taught ESOL
Class average disciplinary incidents
per student
Class average proportion Black
students
Class average proportion Hispanic
students
Class average free/reduced-price
lunch students
Teacher Value-Added in Math
Teacher Value-Added in Reading
Number of Teacher-Year
Observations

Teachers
Eligible for
Loan
Forgiveness

Loan
Forgiveness
Recipients

0.78 (0.41)
0.14 (0.35)
0.10 (0.30)
0.01 (0.10)

0.75 (0.43)
0.12 (0.33)
0.10 (0.30)
0.01 (0.12)

0.82 (0.38)
0.17 (0.38)
0.12 (0.33)
0.01 (0.12)

10.26 (9.22)
0.13 (0.34)

10.12 (8.93)
0.12 (0.33)

5.09 (4.60)
0.13 (0.34)
1,203.35
(1272.88)

Bonus
Recipients

0.77 (0.42)
0.11 (0.31)
0.03 (0.16)
0.01 (0.08)
14.79 (9.07)
0.08 (0.27)

0.08 (0.27)
0.06 (0.25)
0.03 (0.17)
0.03 (0.16)
0.11 (0.31)
0.15 (0.35)
0.04 (0.20)
0.01 (0.08)
0.09 (0.29)
0.09 (0.29)
0.02 (0.15)
0.04 (0.20)
0.11 (0.31)
0.11 (0.32)
0.08 (0.27)

0.27 (0.44)
0.23 (0.42)
0.08 (0.27)
0.01 (0.12)
0.04 (0.21)
0.45 (0.50)
0.03 (0.18)
0.00 (0.06)
0.30 (0.46)
0.25 (0.44)
0.07 (0.25)
0.04 (0.19)
0.09 (0.29)
0.34 (0.47)
0.03 (0.17)

0.13 (0.34)
0.11 (0.31)
0.02 (0.15)
0.03 (0.16)
0.04 (0.21)
0.72 (0.45)
0.07 (0.26)
0.01 (0.09)
0.23 (0.42)
0.21 (0.41)
0.01 (0.12)
0.06 (0.25)
0.15 (0.36)
0.53 (0.50)
0.05 (0.22)

1,197.53
(184.67)
0.23 (0.42)
0.21 (0.41)
0.06 (0.23)
0.01 (0.12)
0.05 (0.22)
0.40 (0.49)
0.01 (0.12)
0.01 (0.11)
0.28 (0.45)
0.26 (0.44)
0.06 (0.23)
0.03 (0.17)
0.09 (0.28)
0.36 (0.48)
0.01 (0.10)

0.11 (0.44)

0.17 (0.60)

0.18 (0.71)

0.22 (0.65)

0.24 (0.25)

0.25 (0.25)

0.28 (0.27)

0.24 (0.23)

0.24 (0.26)

0.22 (0.24)

0.25 (0.26)

0.11 (0.14)

0.53 (0.29)
-0.02 (0.33)
-0.01 (0.28)

0.52 (0.28)
-0.10 (0.36)
-0.11 (0.33)

0.62 (0.26)
-0.17 (0.40)
-0.13 (0.32)

0.45 (0.28)
-0.11 (0.35)
-0.12 (0.33)

2418181

726458

54949

94833

Note: Eligible Teachers are those who were certified and taught in a critical need area in the same year. Means of time varying
variables are computed across all years in which a teacher is observed teaching.
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Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Years of Experience Teaching in Florida
Public Schools at Time of Initial Loan Forgiveness Award
Years of
Experience
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
More than 15
Total

Loan
Forgiveness Initial
Award
6.00
62.31
14.85
5.94
3.60
1.79
1.35
1.01
0.66
0.51
0.44
0.40
0.29
0.22
0.09
0.04
0.51
100.00
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Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of the
Probability of Exit from the Florida Public School System
Independent Variable
Ever Eligible in MS/HS Science x MS/HS
Science a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in MS/HS Math x MS/HS
Math a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in Special Ed/Gifted x Special
Ed/Gifted a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in Foreign Languages x
Foreign Languages a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in MS/HS English x MS/HS
English a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in Reading x MS/HS Reading
a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in ESOL x ESOL a
Designated Area
Taught Certified and Taught Covered
Subject x MS/HS Teacher x Year 1999
Controls for Ever Taught and Certified in
Each Ever-Designated Area

Model 1
0.911**
(0.029)

Model 2
0.901**
(0.030)

Model 3
0.898**
(0.031)

Model 4
0.896**
(0.031)

0.896**
(0.029)

0.898**
(0.030)

0.898**
(0.031)

0.898**
(0.031)

0.975
(0.029)

0.980
(0.030)

0.981
(0.031)

0.972
(0.031)

0.878**
(0.046)
1.053
(0.038)

0.865**
(0.047)
1.037
(0.039)

0.881**
(0.050)
1.026
(0.040)

0.885**
(0.050)
1.022
(0.040)

1.099
(0.099)

1.105
(0.104)

1.105
(0.107)

1.099
(0.107)

0.726**
(0.049)

0.723**
(0.051)

0.723**
(0.052)

0.729**
(0.053)

0.678**
(0.066)

0.680**
(0.068)

0.681**
(0.073)

0.675**
(0.072)









Controls for each Subject Designated a
Critical Shortage Area









Controls for Teacher Base Salary and
District Fixed Effects



















Controls for Teacher Demographics
Controls for Teacher Experience and
Advanced Degree Attainment
Controls for Courses Taught and
Classroom-level Student Characteristics



Number of Observations

553,113

518,342

495,839

490,915

Number of Teachers

124,058

117,042

114,825

114,400

Log Likelihood

-704,727

-655,937

-612,521

-603,015

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Teacher demographics include gender and race/ethnicity.
Experience/degree attainment controls include indicators for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4-9, 20-29, 30-39, 40+ years of experience
and an indicator for possession of an advanced degree. Classroom characteristics include class size, average number
of disciplinary incidents in the prior year per student, proportion of students receiving free/reduced-price lunch,
proportion of students who are black, and proportion of students who are Hispanic. All models include year effects.
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of the Probability of Exit from the Florida
Public School System, Allowing for Effects of Loan Forgiveness to Vary by Size of Payout
Independent Variable
Ever Eligible in MS/HS Science x MS/HS
Science a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in MS/HS Math x MS/HS
Math a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in Special Ed/Gifted x Special
Ed/Gifted a Designated Area [Low]
Ever Eligible in Special Ed/Gifted x Special
Ed/Gifted a Designated Area [High]
Ever Eligible in Foreign Languages x
Foreign Languages a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in MS/HS English x MS/HS
English a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in Reading x MS/HS Reading
a Designated Area
Ever Eligible in ESOL x ESOL a
Designated Area [Low]
Ever Eligible in ESOL x ESOL a
Designated Area [High]
Taught Certified and Taught Covered
Subject x MS/HS Teacher x Year 1999
Controls for Ever Taught and Certified in
Each Ever-Designated Area

Model 1
0.923**
(0.030)

Model 2
0.910**
(0.031)

Model 3
0.908**
(0.031)

Model 4
0.906**
(0.031)

0.905**
(0.029)

0.905**
(0.030)

0.905**
(0.031)

0.905**
(0.031)

0.995
(0.030)

0.998
(0.031)

0.998
(0.032)

0.990
(0.032)

0.877**
(0.036)
0.887**
(0.047)

0.898**
(0.037)
0.872**
(0.048)

0.899**
(0.038)
0.887**
(0.050)

0.891**
(0.038)
0.891**
(0.051)

1.055
(0.039)

1.039
(0.039)

1.028
(0.040)

1.024
(0.040)

1.095
(0.099)

1.101
(0.104)

1.101
(0.107)

1.095
(0.106)

0.747**
(0.051)

0.743**
(0.053)

0.747**
(0.055)

0.755**
(0.056)

0.604**
(0.063)

0.609**
(0.065)

0.582**
(0.065)

0.579**
(0.065)

0.646**
(0.064)

0.654**
(0.066)

0.654**
(0.070)

0.648**
(0.070)









Controls for each Subject Designated a
Critical Shortage Area









Controls for Teacher Base Salary and
District Fixed Effects



















Controls for Teacher Demographics
Controls for Teacher Experience and
Advanced Degree Attainment
Controls for Courses Taught and
Classroom-level Student Characteristics



Number of Observations

553,113

518,342

495,839

490,915

Number of Teachers

124,058

117,042

114,825

114,400

Log Likelihood

-704,717

-655,929

-612,513

-603,007

Note: “High” and “Low” refer to high and low average payout periods (pre-2001/2002 and 2001/2002 and later).
See also notes from Table 4.
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Table 6: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of the Probability of Exit from the Florida
Public School System Sample Limited to Cohorts of New Teachers +/- 2 Years around
Change in Critical Shortage Area Designation
Subject Area and Teacher Cohorts
Middle &
High Math

Middle &
High
Science

Independent Variable

1998/1999 –
2001/2002
Ever Eligible in Subject x
Subject a Designated Area

0.880*
(0.066)

0.825**
(0.062)

Foreign
Language

Middle &
High English

Reading

1999/2000 –
2002/2003

2006/2007 –
2009/2010

2000/2001 –
2003/2004

0.797*
(0.101)

0.961
(0.061)

0.985
(0.192)

Controls for Ever Taught and
Certified in Each EverDesignated Area









Controls for each Subject
Designated a Critical
Shortage Area









Controls for Teacher Base
Salary and District Fixed
Effects









Number of Observations

143,823

133,719

96,642

133,608

Number of Teachers

24,144

23,656

29,595

25,061

-160,447

-147,125

-113,921

-151,183

Log Likelihood
Note: See notes for Table 4.
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